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Abstract
Justification Awareness Models, JAMs, were proposed by S. Arte-
mov as a tool for modelling epistemic scenarios like Russel’s Prime
Minister example. It was demonstrated that the sharpness and the
injective property of a model play essential role in the epistemic us-
age of JAMs. The problem to axiomatize these properties using the
propositional justification language was left opened. We propose the
solution and define a decidable justification logic Jref that is sound and
complete with respect to the class of all sharp injective justification
models.
1 Introduction
Justification Awareness Models (JAM) were introduced in [3] as a flexible
tool for modelling epistemic scenarios like Russel’s Prime Minister example.1
A JAM consists of a basic model for justification logic J− (see [2]), supplied
with the means to distinguish acceptable (i.e. meaningful) and knowledge-
producing justifications.
In this paper we consider the first component. It is referred in [3] as
a basic justification model. The language of the model extends the usual
propositional language by new atoms, justification assertions, of the form
1In [3] they were referred as JEMs, Justification Epistemic Models. Later the termi-
nology was changed.
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t : F with the intended meaning “t is a justification of F”. Justifications
are terms built from atomic ones by a binary operation · (application) that
reflects logical reasonings via Modus ponens rule, so the following property
is assumed:
s: (F → G)→ (t:F → [s·t]:G). (1)
Justification logic J− is the extension of the classical propositional logic
by Application axiom (1) and a basic justification model (up to some details
of the formulation, see Section 2.1) corresponds to a single world in the
constructive canonical model for J−. In such a model a justification t denotes
the set of formulas justified by t and the justification assertion t : F means
that F is a member of this set. The application · denotes a binary operation
on sets of formulas that satisfied the condition (1).
The epistemic usage of JAMs involves the detailed analysis of the term
structure of a model. The following properties of a model, the sharpness and
the injective property, are pointed out in [3] as essential.
Sharpness. Consider a model with some true justification assertion of
the form [s · t] : G. It is a claim that G follows by logical reasoning using
Modus ponens rule from some facts already justified by s and t respectively.
One should treat it as nonsense when there is no such facts. The sharpness
condition eliminates this possibility. It requires that application should be
interpreted by the following operation on sets of formulas:
S ⊲ T = {G | F → G ∈ S and F ∈ T for some F}.
So, in a sharp model the application means application of Modus ponens rule
and nothing more.
Injective justifications. A model is injective if for every justification t there
exists at most one formula that is justified by t. This requirement admits
the treatment of justifications as objects, not only as parts of justification
assertions. The decision whether a justification t is meaningful or knowledge-
producing can be made on the base of the analysis of t itself and does not
depend on the context where it is used. The justified statement vt can be
restored from it, so for meaningful t the justification assertion t : F implies
vt = F and t :vt.
Justification logic J− is sound and complete with respect to the class of
all basic justification models (see [2],[3]). How to axiomatize the class of all
basic justification models that are sharp and injective? This question was
stated as an open problem in [3]. We provide the solution.
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The key idea is to distinguish between the language of a model and the
language of the logic. Both of them are justification languages but in the first
one atoms are treated as constants whereas in the second one they are syntac-
tical variables that admit substitution. An interpretation of the logical lan-
guage in a model is an infinite substitution that replaces syntactical variables
by corresponding expressions of the language of the model, the translation
need not be injective. This approach gives the possibility to axiomatize the
injective property of a model via Unification axioms (see [1],[6],[7] where they
are used for axiomatization of the single-conclusion property of arithmetical
proof predicates).
In the presence of Unification axioms the sharpness property can be ex-
pressed using reference constructions vt. We add them to the logical lan-
guage. Reference constructions in the justification language were considered
in [8],[9] where the general technique was developed and used in the context
of Logic of Proofs. We simplify the exposition and adjust it to the case of
J
− and the particular reference construction “the judgement justified by t”.
As a result we obtain a decidable justification logic Jref and prove that it
is sound and complete with respect to the class of all sharp injective basic
justification models.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic justification models (cf. [3])
Let P 0 (atomic propositions) and J0 (atomic justifications) be disjoint count-
able sets of identifiers. The justification language L(P 0, J0) has two sorts of
expressions — justification terms (Tm0) and formulas (Fm0), defined by the
following grammar:
Tm0 ::= J0 | Tm0 · Tm0, Fm0 ::= ⊥ | P 0 | Fm0 → Fm0 | Tm0 : Fm0.
A basic justification model is defined in [3] as a pair 〈L(P 0, J0), ∗〉 where
∗ is an interpretation that consists of two parts, ∗ : Fm0 → {0, 1}, ∗ : Tm0 →
2Fm
0
. It has the following properties:
⊥∗ = 0, (F → G)∗ = 1⇔ (F ∗ = 0 or G∗ = 1),
(t:F )∗ = 1⇔ F ∈ t∗, s∗ ⊲ t∗ ⊆ (s · t)∗.
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The class of all basic models can be axiomatized by the system J− (see
[2]) which is asserted in [3] to be the base system of justification epistemic
logic. Basic models correspond to possible worlds in the canonical model of
J
−, so J− is sound and complete with respect to this semantics (see [3]).
A basic model is called sharp when s∗ ⊲ t∗ = (s · t)∗ for all t, s ∈ Tm0. It
is injective if for all t ∈ Tm0 the set t∗ contains no more than one formula.
These properties of a model become essential when we analyze the term
structure of justifications in more details. Injective justifications can be used
as pointers (see [6], [8], [9] for details). Below we exploit this ability in order
to axiomatize the sharpness property.
2.2 Unification
We remind the unification technique developed in [8], [9]. Let P = {p0, p1, . . .}
and J = {x0, x1, . . .} be sets of syntactical (first-order) variables of two sorts.
The language Lv(P, J) is the extension of L(P, J) by the additional second-
order function variable v of type Tm→ Fm. It is defined by the grammar
Tm ::= J | Tm · Tm, Fm ::= ⊥ | P | Fm→ Fm | Tm : Fm | v(Tm),
so expressions of the form v(t) are additional first-order variables indexed by
terms, vt = v(t). Below we use this notation for better readability.
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Members of Expr = Tm∪Fm will be considered as terms in the signature
Ω = {⊥,→, :, ·} and will be called expressions. In this context a substitution
is a sort preserving homomorphism of free term algebras of signature Ω, i.e.
a function on Expr that maps terms into terms, formulas into formulas and
commutes with symbols from Ω.
We admit infinite substitutions too. A substitution θ is completely defined
by its values on atomic expressions from the set V ar = J ∪ P ∪ v(Tm). Let
Dom(θ) = {z ∈ V ar | zθ 6= z}, V ar(θ) =
⋃
z∈Dom(θ)
V ar(zθ) ∪Dom(θ),
where V ar(e) denotes the set of all z ∈ V ar that occur in e ∈ Expr.
2In [8], [9] these variables are called reference constructions. In the context of Single-
Conclusion Logic of Proofs they represent syntactical operations that restore some parts
of a formula given its proof. It will be seen that v corresponds to the proof goal operation
that extracts a formula from its proof.
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A substitution θ is called comprehensive if t1θ = t2θ implies vt1θ = vt2θ
for all t1, t2 ∈ Tm.
A conditional unification problem is a finite set of conditional equalities
Ai = Bi ⇒ Ci = Di, Ai, Bi, Ci, Di ∈ Expr, i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
Its solution, or unifier, is a comprehensive idempotent (θ2 = θ) substitution
θ : Expr → Expr such that Aiσ = Biθ implies Ciθ = Diθ for i = 1, . . . , n.
The conditional unification problem is called unifiable when such a unifier
does exist.
The classical (unconditional) first-order unification is a special case of this
definitions. In our case the main results of the classical unification theory are
also valid. It was established in [7] for the first-order conditional unification;
the case of a language with reference constructions of the form v(t) was
considered in [8], [9] where the following statements were proved: 3
• The unifiability property for conditional unification problems of the
form (2) is decidable.
• Any unifiable problem of the form (2) has a unifier θ that is the most
general unifier (m.g.u) in the following weak sense: any substitution θ′
that unifies (2) has the form θ′ = θλ for some substitution λ. (Note
that not every substitution of the form θλ must unify (2).)
• The m.g.u. of (2) can be computed effectively given Ai, Bi, Ci, Di,
i = 1, . . . , n.
• The computation of θ can be detailed in the following way. Let V be
the set of all variables v ∈ V ar that occur in (2). It is possible to
compute a finite substitution θ0 with Dom(θ0) ⊆ V such that
zθ =


zθ0, if z ∈ V,
z, if z ∈ (P ∪ J) \ V,
(vtθ0)θ0, if z = vt ∈ v(Tm) \ V.
(3)
We may also assume that θ0 is conservative, i.e.
V ar(θ0) ⊆ V ∪ {vtθ0 | vt ∈ V }. (4)
3The general second-order unification problem is known to be undecidable [4],[5]. In
our case it is decidable. The problem is more simple because there is no nested occurrences
of the funtion variable v in the language.
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The finite substitution θ0 (together with the finite set V ) can be used as
a finite representation of the most general unifier θ. We will call it the finite
part of θ. It can be computed by the variable elimination method, so if two
conditional unification problems S and S ′ are unifiable, S ⊆ S ′, and θ is a
m.g.u. of S with the finite part θ0, then it is possible to choose a m.g.u. θ
′
of S ′ with the finite part θ′0 for which Dom(θ0) ⊆ Dom(θ
′
0). In this case we
will write θ  θ′. Note that if θ  θ′ and Dom(θ0) = Dom(θ
′
0) then S
′ has
the same unifiers as S.
Definition 1 Let S be the conditional unification problem (2) and A,B ∈
Expr. We shall write A = BmodS when Aθ = Bθ for every unifier θ of S.
Lemma 2 ([8],[9]) The relation A = BmodS is decidable.
Proof. The unifiability property of S is decidable. If S is not unifiable then
A = BmodS holds for every A,B ∈ Expr. For unifiable S one should restore
the most general unifier θ of S and test the equality Aθ = Bθ. ⊳
With a formula of the form G =
∧n
i=1 ti : Fi we associate a conditional
unification problem:
ti = tj ⇒ Fi = Fj, i, j = 1, . . . , n. (5)
We shall write A = Bmod G when A = BmodS and S is the conditional
unification problem (5).
3 Referential justification logic Jref
The idea to express the injectivity of justifications via unification first ap-
peared in [1]. Later it was developed in order to axiomatize the single-
conclusion property of arithmetical proof predicates (see [6], [7], [8], [9]). It
was used for axiomatization of symbolic models of single-conclusion proof
logics in [10], [11]. The concept of an injective basic justification model is
more general, so we extend this approach.
We will distinguish between the language of a basic justification model
and the language Lv(P, J) that will be used to formulate the properties of
the model.
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Definition 3 An interpretation of the language Lv(P, J) in a basic justifi-
cation model M = 〈L(P 0, J0), ∗〉 is a comprehensive (infinite) substitution σ
that maps terms and formulas of the language Lv(P, J) into terms and formu-
las of the language L(P 0, J0) respectively, σ : Tm→ Tm0, σ : Fm→ Fm0.
We also require that vtσ ∈ (tσ)
∗ when (tσ)∗ is nonempty. The corresponding
validity relation for formulas F ∈ Fm is defined in the usual way:
〈σ,M〉 |= F iff (Fσ)∗ = 1.
Referential justification logic Jref in the language L
v(P, J) is defined by
the following calculus:
(A0) axioms of the classical propositional logic,
(A1) s : (F → G)→ (t :F → [s · t] :G), (Application)
(A2)
n∧
i=1
ti :Fi → (F ↔ G) if F = Gmod
n∧
i=1
ti :Fi, (Unification)
(A3) t :F → t :vt, (Assignment)
(A4) [s · t] :vs·t → s : (vt → vs·t) ∧ t :vt. (Sharpness)
Inference rule: F → G, F ⊢ G. ( Modus ponens)
Jref extends the justification logic J
−. The set of its axioms is decidable by
Lemma 2. We will prove that Jref is sound and complete with respect to the
class of all interpretations in sharp and injective basic justification models.
Unification axioms (A2) reflect the injective property (see [7], [9]). As-
signment axioms (A3), together with Unification, provide the correct values
for reference variables vt when t :F is valid (the statement vt restored from
t must be equivalent to F ). The last axiom scheme (A4) makes it possible
to reconstruct logical reasonings given the term structure of justifications. It
means the sharpness property.
Theorem 4 Let σ be an interpretation of Lv(P, J) in a sharp injective basic
justification model M = 〈L(P 0, J0), ∗〉 and F ∈ Fm. Then Jref ⊢ F implies
〈σ,M〉 |= F .
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Proof. It is sufficient to prove that the translations of axioms (A0)-(A4) are
valid in M . For (A0), (A1) it follows from the fact that M is a model for J−.
Case (A2). Suppose that 〈σ,M〉 |=
n∧
i=1
ti :Fi, so
(tiσ)
∗ = {Fiσ}, i = 1, . . . , n.
There exists a unifier θ of (5) such that
e1σ = e2σ ⇔ e1θ = e2θ (6)
holds for all expressions e1, e2 occurring in (A2). Indeed, let V be the finite
set of all variables v ∈ V ar that occur in (A2) and σ0 be the restriction of σ
to V ,
zσ0 =
{
zσ, z ∈ V,
z, z ∈ V ar \ V.
Consider a substitution θ0 = σ0λ where λ is an injective substitution that
maps P 0 into (P \V ) and J0 into (J \V ). The substitution θ0 maps Expr into
Expr and is idempotent, but satisfies the limited comprehension condition
(t1θ0 = t2θ0 ⇒ vt1θ0 = vt2θ0) only for terms that occur in (A2). The full-scale
comprehension will be forced by the transformation (3). The corresponding
substitution θ is comprehensive and idempotent. It coincides with θ0 on
variables from V , so the equivalence (6) follows from the injectivity of λ.
We claim that θ is a unifier of (5). Indeed,
tiθ = tjθ ⇒ (tiσ)
∗ = (tjσ)
∗ ⇒ Fiσ = Fjσ ⇒ Fiθ = Fjθ.
But F = Gmod
n∧
i=1
ti :Fi implies Fθ = Gθ and Fσ = Gσ. Thus, F and
G denote the same formula in the language L(P 0, J0), so 〈σ,M〉 |= (F ↔ G).
Case (A3) follows from the definition of the translation. If 〈σ,M〉 |= t:F
then vtσ = Fσ because M is injective, so t : F and t : vt denote the same
formula in the language L(P 0, J0).
Case (A4). Suppose 〈σ,M〉 |= [s · t] :vs·t. Then vs·tσ ∈ (sσ · tσ)
∗. By the
sharpness property of M , there exists a formula F such that F ∈ (tσ)∗ and
(F → vs·tσ) ∈ (sσ)
∗. But vtσ ∈ (tσ)
∗ because (tσ)∗ is nonempty, so F = vtσ
by the injective property of M . Thus, 〈σ,M〉 |= s : (vt → vs·t) ∧ t :vt. ⊳
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4 Completeness
Theorem 5 Let Jref 6⊢ F . There exists an interpretation σ of the language
Lv(P, J) in a sharp injective basic justification model M such that 〈σ,M〉 6|=
F .
The completeness proof is based on the saturation procedure from [8], [9]
where its general form for languages with reference constructions is devel-
oped. We will use a simplified version that fits the language Lv(P, J).
Let (θ,Γ,∆) be the global data structure, where θ : Expr → Expr is a
substitution4 and Γ,∆ ⊂ Fm are finite sets of formulas. The saturation is a
nondeterministic procedure that starts from a formula F ∈ Fm. It initializes
the data structure: θ := id, Γ := ∅, ∆ := {⊥, F}. Then it applies repeatedly
the following blocks of instructions:
1. For every X → Y ∈ Γ that has not been discharged by the rule 1 before
nondeterministically add Y to Γ or add X to ∆. Discharge X → Y
and all its descendants (its substitutional instances that will be added
to Γ by block 3 later). For every X → Y ∈ ∆ add X to Γ and add Y
to ∆. Repeat these actions until Γ,∆ will not change. If Γ ∩ ∆ 6= ∅
then terminate with failure else go to 2.
2. For every t : X ∈ Γ add t : vt to Γ. For every term t that occurs in
some formula from Γ ∪ ∆ do: if tθ : vtθ ∈ Γ add t : vt to Γ. For every
[s · t] : X ∈ Γ also add s : (vt → X) and t : vt to Γ. For every pair
s : (X → Y ), t :X ∈ Γ do: if the term s · t occurs in some formula from
Γ ∪ ∆ then add [s · t] : Y to Γ. Repeat these actions until Γ will not
change. If Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ then terminate with failure else go to 3.
3. Combine a formula t1 :F1 ∧ . . .∧ tn :Fn where ti :Fi, i = 1, . . . , n are all
formulas of the form t :X from Γ. Test the corresponding unification
problem (5) for unifiability. If it is not unifiable then terminate with
failure. If it is unifiable then compute an m.g.u. θ′  θ of (5) and
update Γ := Γ ∪ Γθ′, ∆ := ∆ ∪∆θ′. If Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ then terminate with
failure. Otherwise compare the finite parts θ′0 and θ0. If Dom(θ
′
0) =
Dom(θ0) then set θ := θ
′ and terminate with success; else update
θ := θ′ and go to 1.
4
θ is an infinite substitution of the form (3). We store the finite part of it.
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Consider a computation of the saturation procedure. Any action in it
that changes the data structure (θ,Γ,∆) will be called a saturation step.
There are steps of type 1, 2 or 3 depending on the block involved.
Lemma 6 Every computation of the saturation procedure terminates.
Proof. Consider a computation starting from F . Suppose that it does not
terminate with failure. It is sufficient to prove that it contains a finite number
of steps.
Let
V i = V i1 ∪ V
i
2 , V
i
1 ⊂ (P ∪ J), V
i
2 ⊂ v(Tm)
be the set of all variables occurring in Γ ∪∆ and T i be the set of all terms
occurring in Γ ∪∆ at some state i of the computation.
The computation does not change the set V i1 because all substitutions
constructed by steps of type 3 are conservative (see (4)). All variables of a
term t ∈ T i belong to V i1 . Steps of types 1,2 do not change the set T
i. Steps
of type 3 may extend the set T i by terms of the form tθ′, t ∈ T i, but the
choice of θ′  θ together with the idempotency of m.g.u.’s imply that sets T i
will stabilize after some steps too. One more iteration after it will stabilize
the set V2. Consider the part of the computation after it.
Consider two consecutive iterations of blocks 1-3. Suppose that at the
start of the second one there exists a formula X → Y ∈ Γ ∪ ∆ that is
not discharged. It is obtained at the previous iteration from some variable
p ∈ Γ ∪∆ by substitution θ executed by block 3,
X → Y = pθ, p ∈ P ∪ v(Tm).
Formula X → Y and all its descendants will be discharged at the second
iteration by block 1. It means that p will be never used in this role later
because later the substitution will be updated as θ′ = θλ and p θ′ = p θλ =
p θ2λ = (X → Y )θ′, so p θ′ will be a descendant of X → Y and must be
already discharged. Thus, the number of iterations with active steps of type
1 does not exceed the maximal cardinality of sets V i plus one. Two iterations
after the last active step of type 1 will stabilize the conditional unification
problem (5) extracted from Γ and terminate the computation with success.
⊳
Let the initial formula F be fixed. All computations starting from F
form a saturation tree. It has no infinite paths by Lemma 6. Its brunching
is bounded, so the saturation tree is finite.
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Lemma 7 If all computations starting from F terminate with failure then
Jref ⊢ F .
Proof. Consider a node of the saturation tree. Let Γ,∆ be the contents of
the data structure at that node. One can establish by the straightforward
induction on the depth of the node that Jref ⊢
∧
Γ →
∨
∆. For the root
node it implies Jref ⊢ F . ⊳
Proof of Theorem 5. Suppose Jref 6⊢ F . By Lemma 7, there exists a successful
computation of the saturation procedure starting from F . Let (θ,Γ,∆) be
the resulting contents of the data structure, Expr′ = {eθ | e ∈ Expr},
V ar′ = V ar ∩ Expr′, Tm′ = Tm ∩ Expr′, Fm′ = Fm ∩ Expr′,
Γ′ = Γ ∩ Expr′, ∆′ = ∆ ∩ Expr′.
The substitution θ is idempotent, so the set Expr′ consists of all fixed
points of θ. For every term t ∈ Tm′ the set Fm′ contains at most one
formula of the form t :X because θ is comprehensive.
Completion. We construct the set Γ′′ ⊇ Γ′, Γ′′ ∩∆′ = ∅, and the substi-
tution λ : Expr′ → Expr′ as follows. Consider a pair of formulas s : (X → Y ),
t :X ∈ Γ′ such that [s · t] :Y 6∈ Γ′. By the restriction from saturation block
2, [s · t] : Y 6∈ ∆′, the variable vs·t does not occur in formulas from Γ
′ ∪ ∆′
and vs·t ∈ V ar
′. Add [s · t] :Y to Γ′ and set vs·tλ := Y . Note that the set of
all variables occurring in formulas from Γ′ ∪∆′ remains unchanged. Repeat
this step until Γ′ will not change and define Γ′′ as the least fixed point of it.
The substitution λ defined by this process is idempotent, Dom(λ) ⊂
v(Tm′), V ar(λ) ⊂ V ar′ and Xλ = X for X ∈ Γ′ ∪∆′. Let
P 0 = {p ∈ V ar′ | pλ = p}, J0 = V ar′ ∩ J.
Consider the language L(P 0, J0) with the interpretation ∗ defined by Γ′′:
p∗ = 1⇔ p ∈ Γ′′ for p ∈ P 0,
t∗ = {X | t :X ∈ Γ′′} for t ∈ Tm0.
By the construction, it is a basic justification model M that is sharp and
injective. The sharpness condition is forced by saturation block 2 and the
completion procedure. The model is injective because for each t the set Γ′
contains at most one formula of the form t :X and the completion procedure
preserves this property.
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Lemma 8 (Truth lemma) If G ∈ Γ′′ then G∗ = 1, if G ∈ ∆′ then G∗ = 0.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the complexity of G. Note that Γ′′∩∆′ =
∅. If G is atomic or has the form t :X then the statement follows from the
definition of *. For G of the form X → Y it is forced by saturation block 1.
In this case G ∈ Γ′ ∪∆′, so it will be discharged by block 1 at some step. ⊳
The substitution σ = θλ is an interpretation of the language Lv(P, J) in
M . Indeed, it is idempotent because θ and λ are idempotent and V ar(λ) ⊂
V ar′. It is comprehensive because θ is comprehensive andDom(λ) ⊆ v(Tm′).
As a consequence, the equality vtσ = vtσσ holds for each t ∈ Tm.
Suppose (tσ)∗ 6= ∅ for some t ∈ Tm. Then tσ = tθ = t′, (t′)∗ = {X ′} and
t′ :X ′ ∈ Γ′′ for some t′ ∈ Tm′, X ′ ∈ Fm′. If t′ :X ′ ∈ Γ′ then, by saturation
block 2, t′ :vt′ ∈ Γ
′, and vt′θ = X
′θ = X ′ by saturation block 3. But in this
case vtσ = vt′θ because X
′λ = X ′. If t′ :X ′ ∈ Γ′′ \ Γ′ then vt′λ = F
′ by the
definition of λ and vtσ = vt′λ. In both cases vtσ = X
′ ∈ (tσ)∗.
We have Fσ = Fθ ∈ ∆′. By Truth lemma, (Fσ)∗ = 0, so 〈σ,M〉 6|= F . ⊳
Corollary 9 The logic Jref is decidable.
Proof. Jref ⊢ F iff all computations of the saturation procedure starting from
F terminate with failure. The saturation tree is finite and can be restored
from F . ⊳
Comment. Basic justification models that are injective but not neces-
sarily sharp can be axiomatized in the language L(P, J) without function
variable v by axioms (A0)-(A3). The definition of a unifier used in (A3)
should be simplified by omitting the comprehension condition and all other
items that involve expressions of the form vt. The corresponding justification
logic is also decidable.
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